The Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) is an unconditional cash transfer program designed to strengthen the livelihoods of extremely vulnerable populations in Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL). Targeting the poorest districts identified by the 2005 Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS)—Turkana, Mandera, Marsabit, and Wajir—the HSNP addresses chronic poverty in a region marked by drought, historical marginalization, weak infrastructure, and high illiteracy rates.
Launched in 2007, the HSNP began as a pilot (2008–2013) testing different targeting mechanisms, including proxy means testing, community-based selection, and age-based criteria.[RC1] [RC2] These three types of targeting mechanism were implemented simultaneously in the selection of beneficiary: community-based targeting (CBT), dependency ratio (DR) targeting and a social pension (SP) approach. In the CBT approach, the community determine the poorest households in up to 50% of the population.The DR approach targets households with vulnerable members (children, elderly people, and disabled or chronically ill people) irrespective of other factors (e.g.wealth). The SP approach selects any individual over 55 years old irrespective of other criteria. Households in the treatment group begin receiving transfers immediately, whereas households in the control group operate as counterfactuals throughout the duration of the pilot study, and only begin to receive transfers after two years.
Fifty-one percent of the households in the treatment sub-locations, approximately 60,000 households in total, were selected to receive the bi-monthly cash transfer. Its initial phase aimed to reach 69,000 households with regular cash transfers, overcoming challenges such as remote geography, thin markets, and beneficiary mobility through innovative payment systems. Instead of relying on weak public institutions, the program used biometric cards and point-of-sale (POS) devices, enabling flexible cash disbursement via private sector banking.
Phase II (2013–2017) expanded coverage to 100,000 households, maintaining its core objective of providing predictable cash transfers to reduce poverty and replace traditional food aid. Additionally, the HSNP 2 implemented a welfare score and revised harmonised targeting methodology (HTM) as a result of the pilot program´s results. Originally a Government of Kenya (GoK) initiative with support from DFID and later Australia’s DFAT, the HSNP has delivered unconditional cash transfers to approximately 100,000 households since 2009. Additionally, its mass registration system allows rapid scaling during droughts, extending support to up to 250,000 more households in crises.
The program’s third phase transitions HSNP to full GoK ownership and financing, with the UK supporting capacity-building for disaster risk financing and economic inclusion. Managed through an FCDO-World Bank Trust Fund under the Kenya Social and Economic Inclusion Programme (KSEIP), Phase 3 benefits from a $250 million IDA loan (2018–2023) to expand HSNP into new counties and pilot economic inclusion initiatives in Kisumu, Makueni, Marsabit, Muranga, and Taita-Taveta.The HSNP's Phase 1 implementation from 2008 to 2012 followed an evolving targeting and payment structure. The program initially aimed to reach 300,000 people (approximately 60,000 households) in 2008, providing bi-monthly cash transfers of KES 2,150 per household, a payment level maintained through 2010 while actual coverage reached 52,854 households that year. In 2011, the program introduced adjustments - first increasing the regular bi-monthly payment to KES 3,000 from September/October while also distributing a one-off payment of KES 4,300 per household during July/August. By 2012, coverage had expanded significantly to 496,800 beneficiaries (68,621 households), with the bi-monthly transfer amount further increased to KES 3,500 starting in March/April, demonstrating the program's scaling capacity and responsiveness to beneficiary needs through periodic payment adjustments.
The program initially targeted four northern counties (Turkana, Mandera, Marsabit, and Wajir) identified as Kenya's most vulnerable areas, beginning with 69,000 households in Phase 1 (2008-2012). Coverage expanded during this phase from an initial 60,000 households (300,000 people) in 2008 to 68,621 households (496,800 people) by 2012, demonstrating gradual scaling.
Phase 2 (2013-2017) significantly increased the target to 100,000 households while maintaining focus on the same ASAL regions. The program developed an innovative shock-responsive design that allowed temporary expansion to cover up to 250,000 additional households during drought emergencies through its pre-registered beneficiary database. This dual-track approach - providing both regular support to chronic poor households and scalable emergency coverage - became a hallmark of the program's coverage strategy.
The transition to Phase 3 under full government ownership included plans to expand coverage to additional counties beyond the original four, while maintaining the core targeting of vulnerable pastoralist communities. The program's coverage mechanism relied heavily on its biometric payment system to maintain accurate beneficiary rolls across these expansions. Notably, the COVID-19 response component you mentioned applied a different urban-focused coverage approach, targeting informal settlements in Nairobi and Mombasa with looser eligibility criteria to enable rapid enrollment during the pandemic. Throughout all phases, the program maintained its foundational focus on unconditional cash transfers while adapting its coverage mechanisms to different contexts - from chronic poverty support in northern Kenya to emergency response in urban areas.
Between November 2012 and March 2018, HSNP Phase 2 spent approximately KES 22.57 billion (£168.49 million) 6 on implementing this programme in four counties in northern Kenya. The majority of this expenditure (76%, a little over KES 17.1 billion/ approx. £128 million) was spent on transfers to households, including both regular and emergency transfers. The remaining 24% (approx. £40 million) of known expenditure up to the end of March 2018 was spent on administrative operations to set up the programme and deliver those transfers to beneficiaries.
The governance of the HSNP and Kenya's COVID-19 cash transfer programs can be characterized as a multi-level partnership model that blends centralized policy direction with decentralized implementation. At its core, the system demonstrates a government-led approach, where the Government of Kenya (GoK) maintains primary ownership and strategic oversight, particularly evident in the HSNP's transition to full GoK financing and management in Phase 3. This central governance layer works in close coordination with international development partners, including DFID, DFAT, and the World Bank, who provide both financial resources through mechanisms like the FCDO-World Bank Trust Fund and technical assistance for program design and capacity building.
Implementation follows a decentralized operational model that leverages private sector partnerships, particularly for payment distribution through banking systems and biometric technologies, while maintaining flexibility to adapt to local contexts and emergency situations. The targeting methodology reveals a pragmatic governance approach that balances responsiveness with administrative constraints - using broad vulnerability criteria during the COVID-19 response to enable rapid rollout, while acknowledging the trade-offs in precision and the need for future improvements within legal data protection boundaries.
The governance structure incorporates built-in adaptive mechanisms, particularly through the HSNP's shock-responsive design that allows for rapid scaling during droughts, demonstrating an institutionalized flexibility uncommon in many social protection programs. This is complemented by the program's learning orientation, as seen in the pilot testing of different targeting approaches and the planned evolution toward more sophisticated systems. The model ultimately represents a hybrid governance approach characteristic of many middle-income country social protection systems, where national leadership increasingly assumes control while strategically engaging international partners and private sector actors to overcome implementation challenges and fiscal constraints.
Evaluation of FCDO’s COVID-19 Cash Transfer in Kenya. E-Pact, May 2020.
Findings: The positive effect of the CT on food security levels was clear: our quantitative analysis estimated that receiving the COVID-19 CT reduced the probability of experiencing severe food deprivation by 32% on average. The quantitative analysis also showed a cumulative effect of the CT over time, with the food security improvements increasing between midline and endline. Our qualitative interviews showed almost all respondents used part of the money to buy food; many stocked up on staple items, which meant they no longer had to worry about providing food to their families on a daily basis.
Does the Hunger Safety Net Programme reduce multidimensional poverty? Evidence from Kenya. Sophie Song and Katsushi S. Imai, Development Studies Research, 2019.
Findings: Results from all the models showed a unanimously negative and statistically significant relationship between program participation and reduction of multidimensional poverty. Beneficiaries experienced a reduction in the MPI ranging from 0.046 to 0.048, implying that the program is successful at reducing poverty.
● Cash transfers represent the most effective form of support, as they empower beneficiaries to allocate funds according to their diverse needs while simultaneously stimulating local markets. The program employs loosely defined targeting criteria focused on vulnerable groups in urban informal settlements—an approach that enabled rapid, remote enrollment during COVID-19. However, this lack of precise criteria has caused some confusion among implementing partners.
● A more nuanced poverty-based targeting system would require extensive additional data collection, potentially delaying implementation or necessitating advanced tools incompatible with Kenya’s data protection laws. Moving forward, preparedness efforts should explore feasible targeting innovations within legal constraints.
● Despite initial delays, the program’s timing proved relevant, coinciding with Nairobi and Mombasa’s second COVID-19 wave and addressing acute needs in informal settlements. The three-month transfer duration aligns with global and national COVID-19 response standards, though many partners argue extended support is needed given the crisis’s prolonged impact.
● The KSH 4,000 transfer amount matches other Kenyan COVID-19 responses and functions appropriately as an individual entitlement. In practice, however, recipients typically pool funds to address household-wide needs rather than individual expenses. This discrepancy is reflected in partner and beneficiary feedback: only half of implementing partners considered the amount sufficient, and just 58% of beneficiaries reported adequacy at midline.
● SDG 1: No Poverty
○ Target 1.3: Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and vulnerable.
● SDG 2: Zero Hunger
○ Target 2.1: By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round.
● SDG 10: Reduced Inequalities
○ Target 10.4: Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality.
● SDG 1: No Poverty
○ Target 1.3: Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and vulnerable.
● SDG 2: Zero Hunger
○ Target 2.1: By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round.
● SDG 10: Reduced Inequalities
○ Target 10.4: Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality.
The Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) is an unconditional cash transfer program designed to strengthen the livelihoods of extremely vulnerable populations in Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL). Targeting the poorest districts identified by the 2005 Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS)—Turkana, Mandera, Marsabit, and Wajir—the HSNP addresses chronic poverty in a region marked by drought, historical marginalization, weak infrastructure, and high illiteracy rates.
Launched in 2007, the HSNP began as a pilot (2008–2013) testing different targeting mechanisms, including proxy means testing, community-based selection, and age-based criteria.[RC1] [RC2] These three types of targeting mechanism were implemented simultaneously in the selection of beneficiary: community-based targeting (CBT), dependency ratio (DR) targeting and a social pension (SP) approach. In the CBT approach, the community determine the poorest households in up to 50% of the population.The DR approach targets households with vulnerable members (children, elderly people, and disabled or chronically ill people) irrespective of other factors (e.g.wealth). The SP approach selects any individual over 55 years old irrespective of other criteria. Households in the treatment group begin receiving transfers immediately, whereas households in the control group operate as counterfactuals throughout the duration of the pilot study, and only begin to receive transfers after two years.
Fifty-one percent of the households in the treatment sub-locations, approximately 60,000 households in total, were selected to receive the bi-monthly cash transfer. Its initial phase aimed to reach 69,000 households with regular cash transfers, overcoming challenges such as remote geography, thin markets, and beneficiary mobility through innovative payment systems. Instead of relying on weak public institutions, the program used biometric cards and point-of-sale (POS) devices, enabling flexible cash disbursement via private sector banking.
Phase II (2013–2017) expanded coverage to 100,000 households, maintaining its core objective of providing predictable cash transfers to reduce poverty and replace traditional food aid. Additionally, the HSNP 2 implemented a welfare score and revised harmonised targeting methodology (HTM) as a result of the pilot program´s results. Originally a Government of Kenya (GoK) initiative with support from DFID and later Australia’s DFAT, the HSNP has delivered unconditional cash transfers to approximately 100,000 households since 2009. Additionally, its mass registration system allows rapid scaling during droughts, extending support to up to 250,000 more households in crises.
The program’s third phase transitions HSNP to full GoK ownership and financing, with the UK supporting capacity-building for disaster risk financing and economic inclusion. Managed through an FCDO-World Bank Trust Fund under the Kenya Social and Economic Inclusion Programme (KSEIP), Phase 3 benefits from a $250 million IDA loan (2018–2023) to expand HSNP into new counties and pilot economic inclusion initiatives in Kisumu, Makueni, Marsabit, Muranga, and Taita-Taveta.● Cash transfers represent the most effective form of support, as they empower beneficiaries to allocate funds according to their diverse needs while simultaneously stimulating local markets. The program employs loosely defined targeting criteria focused on vulnerable groups in urban informal settlements—an approach that enabled rapid, remote enrollment during COVID-19. However, this lack of precise criteria has caused some confusion among implementing partners.
● A more nuanced poverty-based targeting system would require extensive additional data collection, potentially delaying implementation or necessitating advanced tools incompatible with Kenya’s data protection laws. Moving forward, preparedness efforts should explore feasible targeting innovations within legal constraints.
● Despite initial delays, the program’s timing proved relevant, coinciding with Nairobi and Mombasa’s second COVID-19 wave and addressing acute needs in informal settlements. The three-month transfer duration aligns with global and national COVID-19 response standards, though many partners argue extended support is needed given the crisis’s prolonged impact.
● The KSH 4,000 transfer amount matches other Kenyan COVID-19 responses and functions appropriately as an individual entitlement. In practice, however, recipients typically pool funds to address household-wide needs rather than individual expenses. This discrepancy is reflected in partner and beneficiary feedback: only half of implementing partners considered the amount sufficient, and just 58% of beneficiaries reported adequacy at midline.
Unconditional cash transfer; Emergency cash transfers in fragile and humanitarian contexts; Environmentally conditioned cash transfer (ECCT)
The governance of the HSNP and Kenya’s COVID-19 cash transfer programs can be characterized as a multi-level partnership model that blends centralized policy direction with decentralized implementation. At its core, the system demonstrates a government-led approach, where the Government of Kenya (GoK) maintains primary ownership and strategic oversight, particularly evident in the HSNP’s transition to full GoK financing and management in Phase 3. This central governance layer works in close coordination with international development partners, including DFID, DFAT, and the World Bank, who provide both financial resources through mechanisms like the FCDO-World Bank Trust Fund and technical assistance for program design and capacity building.
Implementation follows a decentralized operational model that leverages private sector partnerships, particularly for payment distribution through banking systems and biometric technologies, while maintaining flexibility to adapt to local contexts and emergency situations. The targeting methodology reveals a pragmatic governance approach that balances responsiveness with administrative constraints – using broad vulnerability criteria during the COVID-19 response to enable rapid rollout, while acknowledging the trade-offs in precision and the need for future improvements within legal data protection boundaries.
The governance structure incorporates built-in adaptive mechanisms, particularly through the HSNP’s shock-responsive design that allows for rapid scaling during droughts, demonstrating an institutionalized flexibility uncommon in many social protection programs. This is complemented by the program’s learning orientation, as seen in the pilot testing of different targeting approaches and the planned evolution toward more sophisticated systems. The model ultimately represents a hybrid governance approach characteristic of many middle-income country social protection systems, where national leadership increasingly assumes control while strategically engaging international partners and private sector actors to overcome implementation challenges and fiscal constraints.
The HSNP’s Phase 1 implementation from 2008 to 2012 followed an evolving targeting and payment structure. The program initially aimed to reach 300,000 people (approximately 60,000 households) in 2008, providing bi-monthly cash transfers of KES 2,150 per household, a payment level maintained through 2010 while actual coverage reached 52,854 households that year. In 2011, the program introduced adjustments – first increasing the regular bi-monthly payment to KES 3,000 from September/October while also distributing a one-off payment of KES 4,300 per household during July/August. By 2012, coverage had expanded significantly to 496,800 beneficiaries (68,621 households), with the bi-monthly transfer amount further increased to KES 3,500 starting in March/April, demonstrating the program’s scaling capacity and responsiveness to beneficiary needs through periodic payment adjustments.
The program initially targeted four northern counties (Turkana, Mandera, Marsabit, and Wajir) identified as Kenya’s most vulnerable areas, beginning with 69,000 households in Phase 1 (2008-2012). Coverage expanded during this phase from an initial 60,000 households (300,000 people) in 2008 to 68,621 households (496,800 people) by 2012, demonstrating gradual scaling.
Phase 2 (2013-2017) significantly increased the target to 100,000 households while maintaining focus on the same ASAL regions. The program developed an innovative shock-responsive design that allowed temporary expansion to cover up to 250,000 additional households during drought emergencies through its pre-registered beneficiary database. This dual-track approach – providing both regular support to chronic poor households and scalable emergency coverage – became a hallmark of the program’s coverage strategy.
The transition to Phase 3 under full government ownership included plans to expand coverage to additional counties beyond the original four, while maintaining the core targeting of vulnerable pastoralist communities. The program’s coverage mechanism relied heavily on its biometric payment system to maintain accurate beneficiary rolls across these expansions. Notably, the COVID-19 response component you mentioned applied a different urban-focused coverage approach, targeting informal settlements in Nairobi and Mombasa with looser eligibility criteria to enable rapid enrollment during the pandemic. Throughout all phases, the program maintained its foundational focus on unconditional cash transfers while adapting its coverage mechanisms to different contexts – from chronic poverty support in northern Kenya to emergency response in urban areas.
Between November 2012 and March 2018, HSNP Phase 2 spent approximately KES 22.57 billion (£168.49 million) 6 on implementing this programme in four counties in northern Kenya. The majority of this expenditure (76%, a little over KES 17.1 billion/ approx. £128 million) was spent on transfers to households, including both regular and emergency transfers. The remaining 24% (approx. £40 million) of known expenditure up to the end of March 2018 was spent on administrative operations to set up the programme and deliver those transfers to beneficiaries.